Submission to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade regarding Bill S-10 to Implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Submission from Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic
October 2012
Introduction

Human Rights Watch and Harvard Law School’s International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) appreciate this opportunity to submit a brief to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade regarding Bill S-10. The Bill seeks to allow Canada to ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions by creating offenses for certain acts related to cluster munitions, as required by Article 9 of the convention. The Fourth Meeting of States Parties to the convention will be held in September 2013 in Zambia, and we hope to see Canada participating there as a state party.

Human Rights Watch and IHRC thank Canada for its efforts to ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions and to codify the categorical prohibitions on use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of the weapons and assistance with those activities. We wish, however, to call attention to certain provisions of the Bill that, as written, may fail to achieve, or even run counter to, the convention’s goals. We are especially concerned that the Bill:

- Permits assistance with cluster munition-related activities, including use, in the course of joint military operations and cooperation with states not party to the convention;
- Allows stockpiling of cluster munitions in and transit of them through Canadian territory;
- Provides only a limited ban on transfer of cluster munitions; and
- Fails explicitly to prohibit investment in the production of cluster munitions.

The Bill should be amended to prohibit categorically assistance, foreign stockpiling, transit, and investment and to broaden the definition of transfer. In addition, we call on Canada to fulfill its legal responsibility to implement the convention’s positive obligations, including by setting a deadline for stockpile destruction, helping other states parties meet their obligations, submitting transparency reports, working to universalize the convention and promote its norms, notifying allies of its convention obligations, and discouraging the use of cluster munitions.

After providing background information on our organizations, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the procedural history of the bill, we present our comments on and recommendations for specific provisions of the Bill. We urge the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade to revise the Bill in order to give strong effect to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and to bring Canada in line with its international commitments.

Who We Are

Human Rights Watch is one of the world’s leading independent organizations dedicated to defending and protecting human rights and international humanitarian law. The Arms Division of Human Rights Watch in
particular has taken a preeminent role in documenting the harm to civilians caused by cluster munitions and landmines, and its research and analysis has informed the international campaigns to ban these weapons.

Harvard Law School's International Human Rights Clinic is a center for critical thought and active engagement in human rights and international humanitarian law. Each year, IHRC partners with local and international nongovernmental organizations around the world to advance these bodies of law through legal and policy analysis, advocacy, field research, and litigation.

Human Rights Watch has played a leading role in the campaign to ban cluster munitions since its inception, and IHRC has been involved since 2005. Both organizations participated actively in the negotiation of the convention during the Oslo Process, which culminated in the treaty's adoption. They also participated in subsequent meetings of states parties in 2010 (Vientiane, Laos), 2011 (Beirut, Lebanon), and 2012 (Oslo, Norway). They have collaborated on this brief as well as many other projects promoting strong interpretation and implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.¹

**Background on the Convention on Cluster Munitions**

The Convention on Cluster Munitions is a groundbreaking legal instrument that prohibits use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions, as well as assistance with any of these activities. In addition, the convention establishes a set of strong positive obligations. It requires stockpile destruction, clearance of cluster munition remnants, victim assistance, provision of international cooperation and assistance, and transparency reports. It also obligates states parties to work toward universalization of the convention, to promote the convention's norms, to discourage cluster munitions use, and to notify allies of their obligations under the convention.

Under Article 9 of the convention, states parties are obligated to “take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures to implement this Convention.” States parties must adopt “penal sanctions to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party” and implement the positive obligations contained in the convention.

The Convention on Cluster Munitions was opened for signature on December 3, 2008. It entered into force and became binding international law for states parties on August 1, 2010. As of October 10, 2012, 77 states had ratified or acceded to the convention, indicating their intent to be legally bound by all the convention’s provisions, and 108 had signed it, meaning that they have agreed to the treaty in principle and are prohibited from violating its object and purpose.²
As many states are now in the ratification or accession process, attention has focused on national implementation of the convention’s prohibitions. States parties and other international players have expressed special concern about how some national legislation implements provisions related to joint military operations. At the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2012, the vice president of the International Committee of the Red Cross noted that “more vigilance is needed to ensure that States Parties involved in multinational military operations adopt national implementing legislation that is consistent with both the letter of the Convention and its object and purpose.” The spokesperson for the UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group for Mine Action also called for upholding “the letter and the spirit of this important Convention,” and stated, “It is critical, in particular, that national legislation prohibit all actions that would, in any way, contribute to the continued use of cluster munitions.” Human Rights Watch and IHRC share these concerns.

History of Bill S-10
Canada was an active participant in the development of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and was among the first 94 countries to sign the convention in December 2008. Sen. Marjory Lebreton introduced the proposed Canadian Act to Implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Bill S-10), and the first reading commenced on April 25, 2012. The second reading ended on June 22, 2012, and the Bill was referred to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade for more detailed study.

Throughout this process, the Bill has attracted criticism from within Parliament and beyond. For example, Earl Turcotte, who headed Canada’s negotiation team during the Oslo Process that produced the convention, said, “[The Bill] would not accurately reflect the commitments we made during negotiations of the convention.” Speaking of the proposed legislation’s loopholes during joint military operations, Turcotte asked, “In what world could a reasonable person claim that any of these exceptions is consistent with a total and unequivocal ban on cluster munitions?...It would require contortions of law, logic and morality to come to such an outrageous conclusion.” Turcotte resigned from his long-time position in the Department of Foreign Affairs to protest the interpretation of the convention embodied by the Bill.

Recommendations
Below we identify key provisions of Bill S-10 that would benefit from revision or clarification. Our suggestions are aimed at ensuring Canada implements the convention in accordance with the letter and spirit of the law.
I. Prohibitions during Military Cooperation or Combined Military Operations

Recommendations

- Amend the chapeau of section 11(1) to read: “Section 6 does not prohibit a person who is subject to the Code of Service Discipline under any of paragraphs 60(1)(a) to (g) and (j) of the National Defence Act or who is an employee as defined in subsection 2(i) of the Public Service Employment Act, in the course of military cooperation or combined military operations involving Canada and a state that is not a party to the Convention, from merely participating in military cooperation or operations with a foreign country that is not a party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.” (new language in italics);
- Delete Sections 11(1)(a), 11(1)(b), and 11(1)(c); and
- Delete Sections 11(2) and 11(3).

a. Section 11(1)

As written, Section 11(1) of Bill S-10 allows Canadian military personnel and government officials to assist states not parties with acts—such as using, acquiring, stockpiling, and transferring cluster munitions—that are absolutely prohibited by Article 1 of the convention. Under Section 11(1)(a), for example, Canadian military commanders may direct or authorize the armed forces of another state to use cluster munitions. Section 11(1)(b) allows military personnel to “expressly request[]” the use of cluster munitions by a state not party if the choice of munitions is not within Canada’s “exclusive control.” Given the collaborative nature of joint military operations, Canadian forces will often lack exclusive control over the choice of the munitions used during joint military operations, meaning the section essentially grants Canadians permission to request use of banned weapons. Section 11(1)(c) allows Canadians on secondment themselves to use cluster munitions. Collectively, these three clauses carve exceptions right through the heart of Article 1. At a minimum, these clauses allow Canadians to load and aim the gun; at their most extreme, they allow Canadians to pull the trigger themselves.

Section 11(1) is meant to implement Article 21(3) of the convention, which allows states parties to engage in joint military operations with states not party but does not provide any exceptions to the absolute prohibitions of Article 1. According to international law, provisions of a treaty—such as Article 21(3)—must be interpreted in light of their context and the object and purpose of that treaty. Canada’s interpretation, as expressed in Bill S-10, runs counter to that rule on several counts.

Since a joint military operation is an opportunity for the military of one state to assist the military of another, Article 21(3) should be read in conjunction with Article 1’s prohibition against assisting with activities banned by the convention. The language on assistance is a categorical prohibition that should apply in all situations, including during joint military operations with states not party. Article 1(1)’s chapeau provides that states parties must “never under any circumstances” engage in activities, such as
assistance, that are prohibited by the convention. Paragraph 1(c) under that chapeau broadens the application by proscribing assistance to “anyone” to engage “in any activity” involving cluster munitions. Rather than preserve the convention’s unqualified and expansive ban on assistance, Bill S-10 makes unwarranted exceptions for joint military operations.

Canada’s proposed implementation of Article 21(3) also runs counter to Article 21(1) and (2). Article 21(1) requires states parties to strive for universalization of the convention. Article 21(2) lays out three further steps states parties must take when relating to states not party: notify states not party of their obligations under the convention, take positive action to promote the norms of the convention, and make best efforts to discourage states not party from using cluster munitions. Article 21 cannot logically be understood to require Canada to discourage use and at the same time allow Canada to assist with use; however, the Bill adopts such a contradictory approach.

Just as the language of the convention calls for a broad understanding of the ban on assistance, so too does its object and purpose. The preamble articulates the goal of the convention: to eliminate cluster munitions and to bring an end to the suffering they cause. Canada’s proposed legislation, which would facilitate ongoing use of the weapons, would directly contravene this aim.

In accordance with the blanket prohibition on assistance in Article 1, the positive duty to discourage use under Article 21, and the object and purpose of the convention, Article 21(3) should be read as authorizing joint military operations only to the extent that the ban on assistance with prohibited acts is maintained. That is, Article 21(3) should be understood as a clarification of—not a qualification of or exception to—Article 1’s prohibitions. Article 21(3) clarifies that military personnel may participate in joint military operations; however, it does not give them license to violate the prohibitions of convention. The current language of Section 11(1) takes the opposite approach and adopts language that goes further than Article 21(3). As indicated by the Bill’s title of the section, drafters view it as an “exception” for many acts during such operations that on their face violate the convention.

The legislation of other states provides a model Canada could adopt to meet its obligations under the convention without interfering with military partnerships or its ability to participate in joint military operations with states not party. New Zealand’s 2009 legislation implementing the convention explicitly allows for joint military operations while preserving the convention’s prohibitions. Its Section 11(6) provides:

A member of the Armed Forces does not commit an offence against section 10(1) [which lays out the prohibitions] merely by engaging, in the course of his or her duties, in
operations, exercises, or other military activities with the armed forces of a State that is not a party to the Convention and that has the capability to engage in conduct prohibited by section 10(1).\textsuperscript{11}

The New Zealand law, however, does not create any exceptions to the convention’s prohibitions. This approach, which has also recently been adopted by Guatemala,\textsuperscript{12} remains true to the object and purpose of the convention and allows a state to balance its obligations under the convention with its obligations to any allies that have not yet joined.

At least 35 states have articulated support for this interpretation of the convention’s interoperability provision. For instance, in a commentary attached to its implementation legislation, NATO member Norway explained that “the exemption for military cooperation does not authorise states parties to engage in activities prohibited by the convention.”\textsuperscript{13} Ten other NATO members have issued similar interpretations: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Portugal, and Slovenia.\textsuperscript{14} Canada should follow their lead in its implementation legislation.

\textbf{b. Sections 11(2) and 11(3)}

As written, Sections 11(2) and 11(3) provide further defenses for individuals who act contrary to the absolute prohibition on assistance in Article 1 of the convention. These sections are broader than 11(1) because they apply to all persons, not just Canadian military personnel and government officials. Section 11(3) is especially broad because it creates a blanket exception for all assistance during joint military operations “if it would not be an offence for that other person to commit that act.” Sections 11(2) and 11(3) run counter to Article 1 and the purpose of the convention by allowing such assistance, and therefore they should be removed from the Bill.

\textbf{II. Prohibition on Foreign Stockpiling}

\textbf{Recommendations}

- At a minimum, amend Section 11 as recommended above.
- In addition, insert in Section 6 a paragraph stating that it is prohibited to “facilitate the stockpiling of cluster munitions, explosive submunitions, or explosive bomblets by states not party on territory under Canadian jurisdiction or control.”

As it now stands, Bill S-10 does not create an express defense for allies stockpiling cluster munitions in Canadian territory, but it could be read to allow Canadian military personnel and government officials to
facilitate such stockpiling. Section 11(1)(a), for example, seems to allow Canadian personnel to direct or authorize stockpiling of cluster munitions by states not party in Canadian territory. Section 11(1)(c) permits Canadian officers to possess cluster munitions, arguably including as part of foreign stockpile facilities located on Canadian territory, so long as they are on “attachment, exchange or secondment” to armed forces of states not party. Furthermore, Section 11(3) would allow Canadian personnel, “in the course of military cooperation,” to aid another person to possess cluster munitions, so long as “it would not be an offence for that other person to commit that act.”

Allowing for the hosting of foreign cluster munition stockpiles runs counter to the dictates of the convention. Article 1(1)(c) of the convention forbids states parties from assisting, encouraging, or inducing “anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Facilitating stockpiling of cluster munitions by foreign states in Canada would violate this prohibition because it would assist stockpiling and potentially use of such weapons by states not party. At least 28 states, including ten members of NATO, have issued interpretations clarifying their view that the convention bans the hosting of foreign cluster munition stockpiles. Therefore, an explicit ban on the hosting of foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions should be added to Section 6 of the Bill, and Section 11 should be modified as outlined above.

III. Prohibition on Transit

Recommendations

- At a minimum, amend Section 11 as recommended above.
- In addition, insert in Section 6 a paragraph stating that it is prohibited to “move a cluster munition, explosive submunition, or explosive bomblet into, through, or out of any place under Canadian jurisdiction or control.”

The Bill also does not explicitly prohibit “transit”—the movement of cluster munitions through the territory of a state party. The Bill prohibits in Section 6(c) transfer from one state to another. While the provision could cover transit, it applies only if there is physical movement and the transfer of ownership and control, which means it does not encompass the transit of cluster munitions by a state not party if the weapons do not change ownership and control.

The exceptions given in Section 11 reinforce that the bill is intended expressly to permit transit. As written, Section 11(1)(a) allows for the authorization of movement of cluster munitions by a state not party through Canada. Section 11(1)(c) allows Canadian troops on secondment themselves to move cluster munitions through Canada. Section 11(2) allows any person, in the course of “military cooperation or combined
military operations,” to transport cluster munitions through Canada so long as those munitions are owned, possessed, or controlled by a foreign state. Section 11(3) allows Canadian troops to aid with the movement of cluster munitions through Canada.

Allowing the transit of cluster munitions through Canadian territory is contrary to the convention and should be expressly prohibited. The prohibition on assistance contained in Article 1(1)(c) of the convention should be read to ban the transit of cluster munitions because transit facilitates acts forbidden by the convention—namely the transfer and use of cluster munitions. At least 31 states have clarified that they believe that the convention bans the transit of cluster munitions through national territory, including ten members of NATO. Austria, Switzerland, and NATO member Germany explicitly ban transit in their implementing legislation. Therefore, a general prohibition on cluster munition transit through Canada should be included in Section 6 of the Bill, and Section 11 should be modified as stated above.

IV. Prohibition on Transfer

Recommendation

- Amend Section 6(c) to read: “move a cluster munition, explosive submunition or explosive bomblet from one state or territory to another state or territory, or to transfer ownership of and control over it.” (new language in italics)

The Bill as written adopts a narrow interpretation of transfer. It explicitly proscribes only the movement of cluster munitions “from a foreign state or territory to another foreign state or territory with the intent to transfer ownership of and control over [them].” Under the Bill, persons would be allowed to move cluster munitions from state to state so long as the owner of those munitions never changed. Likewise, they would be allowed to transfer ownership of and control over cluster munitions so long as those munitions never left their present state or territory. Sections 11(1)(a), 11(1)(c), and 11(3) allow for even more possibilities for transfer through authorization, secondment, and aiding and abetting during joint military operations.

Article 1(1)(b) of the convention prohibits, under any circumstances, “transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, [of] cluster munitions.” According to the convention’s definition, “Transfer’ involves, in addition to the physical movement of cluster munitions into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over cluster munitions, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing cluster munition remnants.” The interpretation of “in addition to” has been debated in the context of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Mine Ban Treaty, which uses the same language. To effect the
convention’s goal of eliminating cluster munitions, the definition should be understood to mean that
either the physical movement of cluster munitions or the transfer of ownership of and control over cluster
munitions amounts to transfer. That approach is taken by an Oxford University Press commentary of the
Mine Ban Treaty that analyzed state practice and policies. Section 6(c) of the Bill should thus be
amended to encompass both forms of transfer, and Section 11 should be modified as outlined above.

V. Prohibition on Investment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Prohibit direct and indirect investment of public and private funds in the production of cluster munitions and their components.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As currently drafted, Bill S-10 includes no explicit prohibition on investment. Rather, the Bill implicitly
prohibits investment through its ban on aiding the development or making of cluster munitions as contained in Section 6(f). As one Canadian government official stated, “an investment that is executed with the knowledge and intention that it will encourage or assist cluster munitions production would be captured by the legislation's prohibition on aiding and abetting any primary offence.” A clearer prohibition should be added, however. All forms of assistance are disallowed under Article 1(1)(c) of the convention, and investment in cluster munition production is a form of assistance. The funding of entities that develop and produce cluster munitions or their components allows them—and encourages them—to keep doing so. Twenty-three states, including six members of NATO, have stated that they believe investment in cluster munitions is not allowed under the convention, and six additional states, half of them NATO members, have enacted legislation that explicitly prohibits such investment. Therefore, Canada should add to its Bill a provision that explicitly codifies the prohibition on investment.

VI. Positive Obligations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Implement the positive obligations of the Convention through legislation supplemented by other administrative measures or policies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Bill currently fails to implement any of the positive obligations of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Several such obligations, however, are particularly relevant to Canada. For example, Article 3 of the convention requires a state party to destroy its stockpiles no more than eight years after entry into force of
the convention for that state. Implementing this obligation at a domestic level, as Austria has done,\textsuperscript{23} is important for Canada because in April 2012 Canada reported a stockpile of more than 12,000 cluster munitions, all of which it determined to be “surplus.”\textsuperscript{24} Other positive obligations applicable to Canada include Article 6’s mandate to provide “technical, material and financial assistance” to affected states parties and Article 7’s requirement to submit transparency reports. In addition, Article 21(1) and (2) obligates states parties to encourage states not party to ratify or accede to the convention and notify its allies of its obligations under the convention. A state party must also promote the convention’s norms and make its “best efforts” to discourage other states from using cluster munitions. Implementing these positive obligations facilitates the spread of the convention’s norms and strengthens the stigma against cluster munition use.

Human Rights Watch and IHRC recommend Canada implement the convention’s positive obligations through legislation as the best way to set clear binding rules and ensure that Canada is fulfilling all of its treaty obligations. Canada could supplement such legislative measures with administrative rules or other directives that provide more details.

**Conclusion**

Bill S-10 implements many of the essential elements of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but it should be strengthened significantly. Most important, Canada should close Section 11’s loopholes that allow assistance with use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions during joint military operations with states not party to the convention. In addition, Canada should ensure that its law prohibits hosting of foreign stockpiles and transit of cluster munitions through Canadian territory. Bill S-10 should also broaden its ban on the transfer of cluster munitions and include an explicit prohibition on investment. Finally, Canada should ensure that it implements the positive obligations of the convention. Adopting these revisions will allow Canada to implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions in a manner consistent with the convention’s provisions as well as its object and purpose.


\textsuperscript{4} Agnès Marcillaou, Inter-Agency Coordination Group for Mine Action, Statement at the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, September 13, 2012.


7 Ibid.


14 Cluster Munition Coalition, Cluster Munition Monitor 2012 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, 2010), pp. 34-35. The non-NATO states include: Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Ireland, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Senegal, Sweden, and Switzerland.


16 Ibid. These states (with NATO states italicized) are: Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Comoros, DR Congo, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Ireland, Lao PDR, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Senegal, Slovenia, Switzerland and Zambia.


20 Email communication from John MacBride, Senior Defense Advisor, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Division, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, to Human Rights Watch, July 9, 2012.

21 Cluster Munition Coalition, Cluster Munition Monitor 2012, p. 39. These states (with NATO states italicized) are: Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cameroon, Colombia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, France, Guatemala, the Holy See, Hungary, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, and Zambia.

22 Ibid., p. 38. These states (with NATO states italicized) are: Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, and Switzerland.
