

Edward A. Smith Lecture

The New World Order: Opportunity or Threat for Human Rights?

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Secretary General, Amnesty International (1986-1992)

The Edward A. Smith Visiting Lecturer

Human Rights Program

Harvard Law School

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Preface

Harvard Law School and its Human Rights Program have benefited from a generous gift to the school by Edward A. Smith of the class of 1942. The gift is to be used to bring to the school for a week or so visiting fellows whose commitments and experience speak to issues of social responsibility and to the moral dilemmas facing the legal profession.

Each of the Edward A. Smith visiting fellows over the past seven years amply meets these criteria. All have been prominent in the human rights movement's efforts to develop and protect international human rights movement in which lawyers have necessarily played and will continue to play a vital role. Neelan Tiruchelvam from Sri Lanka addressed the human rights issues stemming from that country's ethnic conflict. Dumisa Ntsebesa from South Africa spoke about the participation of black lawyers in the struggle against apartheid. Tania Petovar from Yugoslavia concentrated on Helsinki groups, including lawyers' work relating to human rights, and the break-up of the Soviet empire in East Europe. Asma Jahangir from Pakistan developed her views about women's problems in that Islamic country, and the roles of women and lawyers in responding to those problems.

This year the Edward A. Smith Visiting Fellow was Ian Martin, who had recently left his six-year post in the U.K. as Secretary General of Amnesty International to become a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Martin spoke at the law school on April 14, 1993, about the implications of the new world order for human rights, and about the responsibilities of those in developed countries to work to better that order.

The Human Rights Program expresses its deep appreciation to Mr. Smith for making possible this fruitful visiting fellow program. It is publishing Mr. Martin's thoughtful and important speech in order to distribute it to a large audience concerned with human rights.

Henry J. Steiner

Professor of Law

Director, Human Rights Program

The Harvard Law School Human Rights Program, founded in 1984, fosters coursework, the participation of students in human rights activities, professional careers that include work to protect human rights, assistance to the worldwide human rights community, and research and scholarship. Through its student summer internships with non-governmental organizations worldwide, its visiting fellows from all over the world who spend from three months to a year at the law school, its visiting speakers and its applied research, the Program forges cooperative links with a range of human rights workers and organizations. It plans and directs international conferences on human rights themes. A brochure describing the Program's activities, including opportunities for visiting fellows (activists and scholars), is available on request.

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Introduction

I am very pleased to have the opportunity to speak to this Harvard audience as the Edward A. Smith Visiting Fellow, and for the opportunity to spend some time with this school's Human Rights Program and students. My theme is the traditional but ever fresh one of change and its challenges.

It was a great privilege to work for Amnesty International for seven and a half years, and to be its Secretary General for six of them, especially when those years saw momentous and global political changes in which human rights were a central impetus. Through this experience I came to understand why the human rights movement made the contribution it has to making human rights a salient international issue in so many countries and regions. It enabled me to share in a moment of optimism when I, like others, believed that we were making progress perhaps limited but nevertheless irreversible progress towards a world in which human rights are better respected. Now, however, it has left me with more questions than answers as to how the human rights movement can effectively confront new patterns of abuse and inhumanity in a new international context at once promising and threatening.

This afternoon I want therefore first to recall the world into which Amnesty International was born and the human rights movement first developed; then to remind us of how dramatically that world has changed; and finally to try to begin no more than begin to face up to the perplexing aspects of the world in which the human rights movement must now go forward.

1. Development of the Human Rights Movement

It may surprise some of you to hear that the specific violations of human rights which inspired the foundation of Amnesty International occurred in an authoritarian Western European country. Peter Benenson, a British lawyer, was enraged to read that two students in Portugal, then under the dictator Salazar, had been imprisoned for drinking a toast to "liberty." His first impulse was to make an individual protest to the Portuguese Embassy. Reflecting on the futility of such an act, he embarked upon a plan to join his protest with those of others. On May 28, 1961, the *London Observer* published his article "The Forgotten Prisoners," which launched what was then called an "Appeal for Amnesty" but which rapidly became Amnesty International. His opening words recalled his own motivation:

Open your newspaper any day of the week and you will find a report from somewhere in the world of someone being imprisoned, tortured or executed because his opinions or religion are unacceptable to his government. The newspaper reader feels a sickening sense of impotence. Yet if these feelings of disgust all over the world could be united into common action, something effective could be done.

The article bore the photographs of six political prisoners. Three were imprisoned by communist governments in Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Three were imprisoned by Western governments: a Greek communist and trade unionist; an Angolan doctor and poet imprisoned by the Portuguese colonial regime; and the Rev. Ashton Jones, an American described in the 1961 caption as a "friend of the Negroes" who had been repeatedly beaten and three times imprisoned in Louisiana and Texas for civil rights activism.

The first feature of the world of the 1960s, which shaped the nature of the human rights movement to which it gave rise, was that human rights were willfully violated by strong authoritarian governments of both the right and the left. Amnesty International was established to focus public attention upon the most extreme forms of state repression: the imprisonment, torture and killing of people for the expression of any opinion to be precise, any opinion which did not advocate violence. This choice of a highly limited focus was thought to permit mobilization of the broadest possible public support. Such violations represented undeniable breaches of a government's international legal obligations. Benenson's article quoted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and referred to the young European Commission on Human Rights. It went on to say that public opinion should insist on the establishment of effective supra-national legal human rights machinery in all continents.

The second dominant feature of that world was its bitter Cold War divisions. As the first selection of prisoner cases in the *Observer* article indicates, Amnesty International's approach was founded on its perception that human rights violations were perpetrated on both sides of that divide. Its goal was to be scrupulously impartial in its approach to governments of different ideological orientation. As Benenson wrote in the *Observer*:

The force of opinion, to be effective, should be broadly based, international, non-sectarian and all-party. Campaigns in favor of freedom brought by one country, or party, against another often achieve nothing but an intensification of persecution.

Amnesty International soon adopted rules to safeguard its independence from governments, including a refusal to seek or accept funding from any government. It was fortunate in establishing a base of funding through its dozen or so leading national sections which avoided and still today avoids dependence on any one or several large private donors or funding agencies, or on any one national source.

This determination to establish impartiality in the face of human rights violations under different political systems led Amnesty International to shun the rhetorical identification of human rights with democracy. But in fact the struggle against violations, committed mostly by undemocratic authoritarian governments, was closely bound up with the struggle for democracy. Thousands of prisoners of conscience for whom Amnesty International worked in its first three decades were political activists challenging the denial of their rights to freedom of expression and association.

In the twenty-five years from Amnesty International's foundation in 1961 to the beginning of the end of the Cold War, it became possible to talk of a human rights movement. Amnesty International itself established strong constituencies in Europe and North America, where other internationally focussed human rights groups already existed or were subsequently founded. Dissidents in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe took a public stand on their governments' international human rights obligations and maintained this stand despite harassment and imprisonment. Others among them organized clandestine flows of information about such repression to the increasingly active campaigners abroad. Repression by military dictatorships gave birth to human rights organizations of extraordinary courage in Latin America, and similar organizations began to emerge wherever in Africa, Asia and the Middle East the political context did not render this impossible.

Over the years, Amnesty International slightly expanded its work beyond the founding focus on prisoners of conscience. It resolved to oppose unconditionally torture and the death penalty, whether used against ordinary criminals or political prisoners. It worked for fair trials in political cases, for how else could one assess whether fictitious and politically-motivated charges were being trumped up against peaceful activists. It recognized that one could not oppose the imprisonment of prisoners of conscience and stay silent when governments found it more expedient to disappear or kill their opponents.

For the most part, other human rights organizations did not restrict themselves as narrowly. Political repression, torture and killing were so prevalent in the world, however, that the main work not only of Amnesty International but also of the human rights movement as a whole was focussed on these most egregious denials of civil and political rights.

The emergence of a non-governmental human rights movement had its reflection in the governmental and intergovernmental spheres. President Jimmy Carter made human rights a central focus of U.S. government foreign

policy, while in Western Europe where Amnesty International sections were strongest, governments began to accept responsibility to seek to influence through their foreign policy the behavior of foreign states violating human rights. The number of states acceding to the international covenants grew, additional human rights treaties and standards were adopted at the United Nations and regionally, and mechanisms to monitor their implementation were brought into existence. NGOs lobbied to create them and their operation depended crucially on information from NGOs. Both Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists devoted much attention to this process.

But the Cold War stood in the way of principled international cooperation for human rights. Western criticism of civil and political rights violations in the Soviet Union and its allies was uninhibited, yet the United States in particular strove to muffle criticism of those Third World regimes which it aided as bulwarks against communism. The recent publication of the report of El Salvador's Truth Commission is the most powerful reminder of the lengths to which a government publicly committed to an active human rights policy would go to conceal the reality of human rights violations carried out alongside an all-pervasive American presence.

It was not only East-West politics which overrode objective human rights considerations. The Western fear of Iran led to a policy of support for President Saddam Hussein which prevented any proper response to the most savage violations perpetrated anywhere in the world even when they reached the level of genocide against the Kurds. Other Western governments engaged in similar hypocrisy to that of the United States for example, the British in Kenya and Malawi, the French in Chad and Zaire, the Italians in Somalia. Each had the best opportunity to know the reality of repression, yet each acted according to interests which led it knowingly to understate the degree of repression.

Meanwhile the use of human rights as an ideologically motivated attack on the Soviet Union and its allies met with an ideological defense. The West, they responded, was identifying human rights with its own conceptions of civil and political liberties. While it was not admitted that these were anything less than perfectly protected under communism, the greatest attention ought, they contended, be paid to the state of economic, social and cultural rights, poorly respected in capitalist societies; and from the perspective of the Third World, to the right to development, obstructed by existing international economic relationships.

2. Political Transformation and the Globalization of Human Rights

And then suddenly, as it seemed, the world changed, and the denial of human rights seemed to be the fundamental reason why it had to change. Political change in the Soviet Union and throughout Eastern and Central Europe was at the center of it. The prisoners of conscience who had constituted the human rights movement in their countries, and for whom the human rights movement internationally had worked, did not just emerge from their prison camps and cells. They emerged to enter the governments and legislatures of their countries, and in some cases the presidential palaces. Human rights safeguards were written into new constitutions and laws. In the international arena at the UN Commission on Human Rights, for example the new governments were suddenly allies instead of obstacles for the human rights movement.

And it wasn't only Eastern Europe. Africa entered the throes of its own movement of multi-party democracy. From independence until 1991, only two African leaders had voluntarily resigned and only once had a leader been voted out of office. In 1991, three heads of state lost elections after bowing to the winds of change while two other former one-party state leaders survived multi-party electoral tests. Nine others were removed from office in as many months, and others saw their dictatorial powers reduced as national conferences debated political change always with the demand for freedom of expression and respect for human rights at the center of debate.

In Asia too, popular demands for the respect for human rights was at the heart of political upheavals. Sometimes it brought about changes in governments in the Philippines, South Korea, Nepal, and Bangladesh. Sometimes the immediate consequence in China and in Burma was intensified repression. But it was possible to believe that the region's future lay with the indigenous voices for human rights which were growing in intensity. Latin America meanwhile completed, in Paraguay and Chile, the emergence from its era of military dictatorships.

There was little to be optimistic about in the Middle East, despite the increasing determination of the region's own few brave human rights activists. Only in Jordan was there a clear trend to improved respect for civil and political rights. Then Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, setting in train a sequence of events which brought torture and killing by Iraq in Kuwait; death, destruction, and suffering at the hands of American, British and French forces in Iraq itself; savage repression by Iraqi government forces of post-war uprisings in the Shiite South and Kurdish North; and more torture and killing in Kuwait, now of Palestinians and other non-Kuwaitis by the Kuwaitis themselves.

There are some--I am not among them--whose global optimism was confirmed by aspects of these events. The United Nations, they perceived, was able to act decisively and successfully to defeat aggression and punish human rights violators in a new context where the Soviet veto no longer operated to frustrate American leadership. Not only was

oppression defeated but new precedents for humanitarian intervention were established to protect the Kurds. No longer would out-dated considerations of national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs prevent the international community from acting in a humanitarian or human rights emergency.

Along the way, in 1989 in fact, the UN Under Secretary General for Human Rights had seen in the new optimism the possibility of a great leap forward in international human rights cooperation. He proposed a World Conference on Human Rights "to deal at the highest level with the crucial questions facing the UN in connection with the promotion and protection of human rights." After consultations, the General Assembly decided in 1990 to convene such a Conference in 1993 to be held in Vienna "to review and assess the progress that has been made in the field of human rights since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to identify obstacles and ways in which they can be overcome to further progress in this area."

How does that progress look to us today? I think that, like Peter Benenson in 1961, when we open our newspaper any day of this week, especially as we read the reports from Bosnia, we feel again what he called a sickening sense of impotence. The reports we read are not just reports of *someone* being imprisoned, tortured or executed, and not now most commonly because the victim's opinions or religion are unacceptable to the government. Open your newspaper any day of the week *now* and you will find a report from somewhere in the world of hundreds of thousands of people being killed, raped, forced from their homes, driven into poverty and starvation, because there is no government able to control the situation in their country, or because there no longer is a country with accepted borders. In 1961, Peter Benenson maintained that if the feelings of disgust all over the world could be united into common action, something effective could be done and he proved it. How can something effective be done in new circumstances today?

3. *Evaluating the Movement: Fears and Prospects*

The human rights movement now finds itself in a radically different context from the one which shaped it. It faces a new pattern of human rights violations stemming from a new global context, and it has to work in a world of radically altered relationships among governments.

The nature and depth of the challenge of the post Cold War era is analyzed, chillingly but accurately, it seems to me, by the Irish historian and former UN official Erskine Childers, like this (in a paper, delivered at a 1992 conference, entitled *United Nations Mechanisms for Intervention and Prospects for Reform*):

History is not only far from ended; it is now making its decisive claims. Endogenous aspirations and societal tensions that had been suppressed under the Western and Soviet empires are now surfacing with great volatility ... The end of the Cold War is exposing a phenomenon of global significance, but one seldom noted that the frontiers of over half of all the member states of the UN, containing a large proportion of all humankind, have no endogenous sanction.

Throughout the Cold War period, ancient cultural, ethnic and linguistic groups remained trapped and largely dismembered within artificial frontiers that had been imposed on them by Belgium, Britain, France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, as well as Czarist and then Soviet Russia. What is now revealed is like a vast minefield re-exposed over much of the surface of Earth after decades of submergence under ice. Seventy years of imperial boundaries evaporated within weeks after the collapse of the USSR, unleashing ancient ethnic and other tensions that are already exploding across European state frontiers with tragic violence and human rights deprivations. We are in fact entering the period when our fledgling peace, security and human rights system under the UN must confront the ultimate and long-delayed geo-political reckonings from the age of Northern empires.

Increasingly, it is these situations of ethnic conflict and disputed borders which give rise to the most acute situations of gross human rights violations. Of course, there remain thousands of victims of authoritarian governments, imprisoned and often tortured because they insist upon their right and that of their peoples to freedom of expression in China, Burma, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, East Timor, Sudan, Cuba, Viet Nam, and elsewhere. The classic role of the non-governmental human rights movement of obtaining and publishing the facts of this repression, and bringing public pressure to bear so as to raise its cost to the government and effect change remains a wholly valid one in all such situations.

But far more victims of human rights violations today stem from armed conflict where there is not a strong government but a weak one, where the perpetrators of killings and rape and torture are as likely to be forces fighting against a government as they are the forces of the government itself. This has led human rights organizations to develop new approaches in the case of Human Rights Watch, to seek to monitor on an equal footing violations of the principles of humanitarian law by both sides in a situation of armed conflict; in the case of Amnesty International, increasingly to report on and condemn arbitrary killing and torture by armed opposition groups as well as by governments, while retaining a primary focus on the international obligations of governments.

The more difficult issue is not what conduct to condemn, but by what forms of pressure it is possible to affect it. Amnesty International's brilliantly naive but effective tactic of deluging offending governments with letters from around the world can have no impact through a government whose formal authority carries no real power over warring bands in its own territory, or on non-governmental groups which are wholly isolated from the international community. What can the human rights organizations do to affect the situation in Bosnia, where the horrific realities of killing, rape, imprisonment, and ethnic cleansing have been on TV screens around the world before the organizations can document them, and where the root of inaction is not lack of awareness of the violations but lack of agreement on what can be done to stop them?

The first new problem for the human rights movement thus lies in the nature of today's most acute human rights violations. The second new problem is in the changing relationship among governments. In the Cold War years in which the major rift among nations was the ideological division between East and West, human rights organizations learned to maintain their principles and objectivity against governments which sought to exploit their work selectively. Today, the major rift is between North and South. These divisions have been most apparent in the inter-governmental discussions preceding the World Conference on Human Rights, a conference conceived in such hope yet whose Preparatory Committee was unable in three long meetings to reach agreement on its agenda. The human rights movement has yet to find its balance amid these divisions.

Free of the inhibitions of Cold War politics, Western governments moved rapidly to use their aid relationships to promote respect for civil and political rights by recipient governments, not just by advocacy but by formal aid conditionality. While Amnesty International has maintained a position of neither advocating nor opposing aid suspension or economic sanctions on human rights grounds, most of the human rights community, not only in the West but in aid recipient countries too, has been motivated by its deep commitment to ending violations to advocate the use of every available pressure, including aid conditionality. In some countries, the consequences seem, initially at least, to have been positive. With extreme reluctance, Presidents Moi of Kenya and Banda of Malawi moved under the threat of aid suspension to free prisoners and hold multi-party elections. Other countries have felt sufficiently self-confident to appear to reject such pressure, as Indonesia did in withdrawing from any aid relationship with the Netherlands when it decided the latter had gone too far in pressing for further action over the Dili massacre in East Timor. Asian governments have now formed something of a common front in opposition to aid conditionality, and have formalized this in the recent Bangkok Declaration of the Asian regional preparatory meeting for the World Conference on Human Rights in which they "discourage any attempt to use human rights as a conditionality for extending development assistance."

The Bangkok Declaration of Asian governments codifies more generally the attitude which many governments of the South share in response to what they see as the threat of a new world order, in which the West dominates the UN and seeks through UN interventionism and through bilateral and multilateral aid policies to impose its human rights and political perspectives. It includes a traditional defense of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states, opposition to the use of human rights as an instrument of political pressure and "the imposition of incompatible values," and a call for the democratization of the UN system. It emphasizes the right to development as a fundamental human right; the need to work for a just and fair world economic order; the interdependence and indivisibility of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights; and the inherent interrelationship between "development, democracy, universal enjoyment of all human rights and social justice."

When such theses are put forward by governments like those of China and Indonesia which have ample reason to seek to divert attention from their abysmal records of civil and political rights violations, one is entitled to question their motivation. Our natural and correct response is to intensify our own commitment to enhancing the effectiveness of international mechanisms that can address them. But it is vital, I think, that the reaction of the human rights movement does not stop there.

It is tempting to use the economic power of the North to apply pressure on aid-dependent countries for civil and political rights protection. But the human rights movement cannot be happy in working through the existing power relationships in an unequal world, nor can it even be neutral in its attitude to them. The existing North/South relationship does undermine human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not guarantee only the right to life, liberty and security of person; the right not to be subjected to torture or to arbitrary arrest; the right to freedom of conscience, expression and association. It proclaims the entitlement to realization of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for the dignity and development of each member of society: the right to work and to protection against unemployment; to a standard of living adequate for health and well-being, including food, clothing, housing, medical care and social security; and the right to education. Most fundamentally, Article 28 of the Declaration states: "Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized."

The number of human beings living in absolute poverty now numbers some 1.4 billion of the world's 5.3 billion people. The number has increased by over 50% in the last twenty years. Including those living along the subsistence margin with only minimal necessities increases the number of poor to nearly 2 billion. Rather than development assistance

mitigating this crisis, North-South economic relations continue to exacerbate it. The Third World has not been able to increase its share of world trade; its share has actually been reduced. Between 1960-1989, the countries with the richest 20% of world population increased their share of global GNP from 70% to 83%. The countries with the poorest 20% of world population saw their share fall from 2.3% to 1.4%. Third World debt has mounted. The industrial countries give a mere 0.35% of their combined GNP in development assistance. Countries that spend a lot on the military are rewarded with roughly twice as much aid per capita as countries whose military spending is more modest. Basic human concerns, including primary health care, nutrition and basic education get the smallest share of aid funds (6.5% bilateral, 10% multilateral). There is now a substantial net capital flow, through debt servicing, from the poor countries to rich creditor nations.

The countries of the North cannot reject the claims that this must be discussed in a human rights context. It is worse that a child dies of starvation than that an adult is beaten by the police. For the most part Western governments have paid lip service to economic, social and cultural rights with the notable exception of the U.S. government under Presidents Reagan and Bush, when the U.S. rejected the very concept of such rights, and thus the universally agreed basis of the entire international human rights framework. But in practice, human rights in the rhetoric of Western governments has been identified with civil and political liberties alone, and the fact that the non-governmental human rights movement has also overwhelmingly addressed itself to civil and political rights violations has strengthened that exclusive identification.

The human rights movement has to consider where it stands in relation to economic relationships in today's world, and to avoid an identification with economic power when human rights considerations require it to be a critic of the international economic order. It must also beware of identifying itself with military power.

Many of today's human rights crises most obviously Somalia and Bosnia seem as if they can be addressed only by armed intervention. Some in the human rights movement, including Amnesty International, have confined their role to placing the facts of human rights violations in front of world opinion without entering into the debate about armed intervention; others have entered into that debate, with differing perspectives. Some have campaigned for armed U.S.-led humanitarian intervention in Somalia, and some would argue for armed intervention in Bosnia today.

I am not arguing that they are wrong, although I have not yet found sufficient certainty to be among them. But I do want to argue against too easy an enthusiasm in the human rights movement, and especially in the United States, for military intervention on humanitarian grounds. The human rights movement has struggled successfully to establish that national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs are not absolute principles which necessarily prevail over the international responsibility to prevent mass violations of human rights. But when it involves the use of force, such international responsibility can be properly exercised only by a multilateral decision of the international community through the UN. And the legitimacy of such decisions of the UN depend upon a proper distribution of power within that organization, the application of a set of principled criteria for military intervention which is not politically selective, and the development of the ability of the UN itself to maintain control of a military operation.

In practice, the legitimacy of decisions of the UN Security Council the composition of which is simply not defensible in today's world has been undermined by their political selectivity since the lifting of Cold War constraints. The imposition of sanctions on Libya stands in stark contrast with the non-imposition of sanctions on Israel for refusal to comply with Security Council resolutions, and Security Council authority has been abused by allowing the U.S., Britain and France to claim a UN mandate for military action against Iraq which they alone have decided upon.

The high-water mark of the mood of new interventionism was the Security Council summit of January 1992, and we should heed the words of Zimbabwe's Foreign Minister who warned:

We cannot but express our apprehension about who will decide to get the Security Council involved in an internal matter and in what manner ... This clearly calls for a careful drawing up of general principles and guidelines that would guide decisions on when a domestic situation warrants international action.

The human rights movement should take up the challenge of helping to develop such principles, because until they exist it must remain inhibited in calling for armed intervention, even though only armed intervention can prevent the continued perpetration of mass violations.

Conclusion

The new world order seems to present the human rights movement with a beguiling prospect. Powerful governments no longer inhibited by powerful adversaries stand ready, it appears, to make the promotion of human rights a centerpiece

of their foreign policies, to wield their economic power to compel compliance with their agenda and to offer their military power through the UN to intervene in humanitarian crises.

My contention is that this is a prospect which the human rights movement should view coolly. It should avoid aligning itself with the power relationships of an unjust world and it should recognize the ways in which the cause of human rights requires that those relationships be challenged.

First, it should base itself firmly on the inclusive framework of universal human rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two principal covenants on civil-political rights and on economic-social-cultural rights. It should not identify itself with the new Western rhetoric of "democracy, human rights and the free market economy." Of course the human rights movement works to guarantee democracy. Universal human rights principles subsume democracy. They provide, however, a more precise definition of rights than can be derived from the hazier notion of promoting democracy, which itself can lead to too great a tolerance of human rights violations of governments which have been popularly elected whatever the conditions and larger context for the elections.

But the real danger of this new trilogy of virtues lies in its implicit identification of human rights with civil and political rights alone, and in its assumption that economic and social rights are guaranteed by a free market economy. Of course, most of us believe that the operation of markets are at the heart of an efficient economy, and that command economies proved an economic disaster as well as being an intrinsic part of the absence of civil and political freedoms in the societies in which they existed. But a wholly unregulated free market economy is not a principle of human rights; it begs the question of how fundamental economic and social rights are to be guaranteed. Too little attention has been paid to this, either in the deregulated economies of Eastern Europe or in the economies of poor countries undergoing structural adjustment programs under international supervision. My own strongest impression from a recent visit to Russia is that the pursuit of a free market economy without a safety net of basic economic and social rights will eventually put at risk the advance in civil and political rights that has taken place there. Russia is far from being the only country where the indivisibility of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights will emerge from the pages of theory to confront those who have focussed on civil and political rights alone.

Second, therefore, the human rights movement should itself give equal priority to economic, social and cultural rights together with civil and political rights. It should search for ways to play as prominent a role in the future in the monitoring and implementation of economic, social and cultural rights as it has in the past in the monitoring and implementation of civil and political rights.

Third, the human rights movement should seek to widen the debate about human rights aid conditionality into a larger debate about development assistance for human rights about the need for the current financial flow from South to North to be reversed, and for positive flows of aid to poor countries to be delivered in a manner which promotes economic and social and civil and political rights in the recipient country.

Fourth, the human rights movement has an enormous stake in the success of multilateralism and the future of the UN in particular. We all feel the frustration of impotence in the face of mass human rights violations in conflict situations which can be addressed only by international intervention. Yet we feel a mistrust of the exercise of military power. The only escape from that feeling and frustration lies in principled multilateral action. The human rights movement has the principles and the impartiality to contribute to the definition of criteria for legitimate intervention, and it must work to develop the effectiveness of the UN and regional organizations in mounting and fully controlling such interventions.

These are in many ways immensely more difficult tasks than those which Amnesty International embarked upon thirty-two years ago. I do not pretend to see clearly how they can be fulfilled, but I do claim that they are inescapable if we take seriously the rhetoric of human rights. I have talked of a human rights *movement* and that movement will be better able to face these tasks if it recognizes what it has become.

The leadership of the human rights movement is not with NGOs based in the West, monitoring human rights in other countries and primarily addressing the foreign policies of Western governments. The human rights movement is today an international movement, rooted in the reality of the struggle for human rights in countries in all regions of the world and with the perspectives of each of those societies within itself. If the human rights movement draws upon its own internationalism, it can transcend today's "new world order" and work towards a new world striving to guarantee the universal principles of human rights to all the human family.

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